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Introduction ​

An adopter of OpenKCM lets its customers control the keys that protect their data, across many services and regions. This page explains the problem OpenKCM solves, its building blocks and the key chain. The other pages of this section go into detail:

PageWhat it covers
DeploymentWhere each component runs, the regions, and where the data of a tenant lives
Main flowsOnboarding a customer, creating a key chain, connecting a service, withdrawing a key, delivering keys to workloads
Security and integrationSecurity principles, the connections between the components, what the provider integrates, and the technology stack

The problem it solves ​

A provider runs many services, in many regions, for many customers. Each service encrypts the data it stores and sends. Customers in regulated industries ask for three things:

  1. Own the key. The key that protects their data comes from them (BYOK) or stays in their own keystore (HYOK).
  2. Decide who may use it. Their own people, signing in with their own identity provider, connect services to keys, with separation of duties, approvals and an audit trail.
  3. Withdraw it everywhere. Disabling the key reaches every service and region that uses it, without a separate request to each service team.

A key management service (KMS) answers the first point for one account in one cloud. OpenKCM answers all three for every customer of a provider, across all of the provider's services: it manages the key chain, from the customer's key down to the keys that the services use.

Architecture at a glance ​

OpenKCM separates four concerns:

PlaneComponentResponsibility
GovernanceCMK: Registry and CMK-2-Krypton Bridge (central); CMK (per region)Tenants, customer keys and their keystores, systems, roles, approvals, audit, propagation of key changes. Holds no key material
Root of trustKeystoresThe customer keys (L1): in a keystore that the provider runs for the tenant (BYOK), or in the customer's own keystore (HYOK)
ExecutionKrypton: root node, agentsThe key hierarchies below the customer key (L2 to L4): generation, sealing, storage, delivery to workloads
ConsumptionThe provider's servicesUse the keys to encrypt the customers' data, and act on key changes

Identity and access sit in front of the governance plane: each customer signs in with their own identity provider, and every request is checked at the gateway.

The key chain ​

The customer key is the root of a chain of keys. Each key protects the keys of the level below, so a few customer keys protect the many keys that services use, and withdrawing a customer key cuts off everything below it.

LevelKeyHeld inManaged byStatus
L1Customer keyKeystore (BYOK) or the customer's own keystore (HYOK)CMKAvailable, with AWS KMS
L2Domain (System) keyKryptonKrypton, driven by CMK through the BridgeSandbox
L3Service keyKryptonKryptonSandbox
L4Data encryption keyKrypton, delivered to the workloadKryptonSandbox

The levels of the Krypton hierarchy are configurable; L2 to L4 is the layout that CMK uses. Protecting the L2 key with the customer's L1 key is part of the target architecture and not implemented yet; until then, CMK propagates key changes to the systems, which act on them.

OpenKCM manages this chain for all customers of a provider, which sets it apart from a key management service that holds the keys of one account. See OpenKCM vs. KMS offerings.

Status ​

The governance plane is available; the execution plane is in Sandbox.

PartStatus
Registry, CMK, CMK UI, ExtAuthZ, Session ManagerAvailable
BYOK and HYOK customer keys, with AWS KMSAvailable
Propagation of key and system changes to the systems of every regionAvailable
Keystores other than AWS KMSNot yet available; can be added as plugins
Krypton key hierarchies and KMIP deliverySandbox
CMK-2-Krypton BridgeEarly stage
Customer key protecting the Krypton hierarchyNot yet available

See also ​

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Funded by the European Union – NextGenerationEU.

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the European Commission. Neither the European Union nor the European Commission can be held responsible for them.